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The dilemma confronting psychiatrists testifying in the law courts
is embodied in the situation commonly called the "battle of experts."
This battle, it may be contended, is an enlarged projection of psychological disagreements arising out of the subject matter itself. To the
psychiatrist this scientific artifact inevitably brings dissatisfaction. To
the legal profession and the public, the planning and strategy over the
mental fate of the prisoner at the bar discredits sincere efforts to describe intricate mental states within legally proper boundaries. Dissatisfaction with legal rules and the apparent reluctance of attorneys
to modify trial rules and practices governing mental disease and criminal
responsibility, amounts almost to a cold war between the two disciplines.
But the appearance of intra-medical struggle between opposing
psychiatric experts on a given case is often more apparent than real.
Underlying the apparent battle of experts lies the application of the
so-called "right and wrong" test for criminal irresponsibility to psychologic thinking. For example, two psychiatrists appearing on opposing
sides may differ to some degree in their estimation of a given case.
They appear however to be much wider apart when forced to express
their opinions in terms of the "right and wrong" test. The public merely
see the obvious aspect of the problem, i.e., the disagreement. They do
not perceive the underlying ideational struggle wherein medical men
try to fit modern psychiatric concepts into standards which jurists must
uphold-concepts which are based on statutory law and legal tradition.
The basic difficulty lies between fundamental legal and medical constructs. How did this conflict develop?
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT

In the interests of clear thinking it may be advantageous to recite
briefly the facts underlying this apparent impasse. In early times, the
alienist was called by the court to aid in deciding the presence of in-
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sanity and idiocy in those defendants on trial for criminal acts. The
jury, however, in judging criminal irresponsibility utilized medical
among other types of testimony from a common sense point of view,
i.e., the reasonable view of the reasonable man. In this function the
jury was guided by the presiding judge who presented the framework
of existing law and legal precedent within which the jury was to
estimate the question of responsibilty. To quote Sir James Stephen:'
"The question, 'What are the mental elements of responsibility?' is, and must be,
a legal question. It cannot be anything else, for the meaning of responsibility is
liability to punishment .. . I think it is the province of medical men to state for the
,information of the court such facts as experience has taught them bearing upon the
question whether any given form of madness affects, and in what manner and to
what extent it affects, either of these elements of responsibility (knowledge that an
act is wrong and power to abstain from doing it)."
In time, legal principles establishing tests for irresponsibility which
were understandable to the "reasonable man," became codified into a
workable formula. This codification was compressed in the English
law into the so-called McNaghten decision of 1843. In the Englishspeaking countries, including all of the States of the Union but one,
the basic test'utilized today is a direct expression or outgrowth of the
McNaghten decision. The tests for criminal responsibility presented
to the jury are today substantially as was stated in one part of the
original opinion given to the House of Lords by Chief Justice Tindal ;2
that a person is irresponsible for crime if "he was laboring under such
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did
not know he was doing what was wrong. '
Thus, the jury tests the question of criminal responsibility as it is
influenced by mental disease. The court enunciates the tests in accordance with the statutes and defines the limits of testimony as it applies
to the crucial question of responsibility. The psychiatric expert interprets his understanding of the symptoms, signs and psychopathology
of the prisoner in terms of its influence on knowledge of right and
wrong in the particular act in question. The expert witness, however,
gives testimony like any other witnesses and, like them, can entertain
an opinion which, when qualified by his special scientific knowledge, is
considered to be of particular value. The expert's function is to render
1.

STEPHEN,

SIR JAMES F., HISToRY

OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND,

miilan Company, 1883, Vol. 2, P. 183.
2. McNAGHTEN'S CASE, 10 CLARK & FINNELLY 200 (1843).
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medical opinion intelligible to the jury in such a way as to allow the
latter to apply the tests for irresponsibility due to insanity, but neither
judge nor jury is bound by expert opinion. The jury's duty is solely to
estimate criminal responsibility of the accused under the McNaghten
formula.
In practice, psychiatrists have utilized a rough standard which
states that if a prisoner was clearly psychotic at the time of the act,
he was also irresponsible, i.e., he did not know wrong from right and
did not know that he was doing wrong. Although the attempt to fit
modern concepts of mental illness into the customary terms of legal
tests has been accomplished with varying degrees of success as far as
juries are concerned, it has been at the cost of mounting frustration on
the part of the expert witness. This sense of frustration has both a
real and a personal (i.e. psychological) basis.
The psychological basis for the psychiatrist's dissatisfaction will be
first dealt with: It is the persistent feeling that his testimony is necessarily twisted out of context and that his best efforts to expound the
scientific viewpoint are thwarted by virtue of the constraints of the law
as embodied in the established tests. So strong has this feeling become
among psychiatrists that many refuse to testify for one side, reFuse to
enter legal disquisitions, wishing to remain as physicians in maintaining
a medical, non-judgmental attitude and non-punitive philosophy toward
the prisoner on trial. In some quarters the feeling of being driven from
the physician's traditional position through legal maneuvers amounts
to an anxiety lest psychiatric testimony in court may be considered to
have attained the level of a racket.
A recent statement by Zilboorg3 regarding the attitudes of the criminologic psychiatrist reflects this anxiety and adds a discernibly moralistic overtone:
It is most pertinent to differentiate between the doctor of medicine who is engaged
in the business of detection of crime or who otherwise serves the ends of penal justice
and the psychiatrist who is called upon to examine and testify as to the mental
condition of a given defendant. There is nothing wrong in a medical man's
choosing the job of psychiatric detective or psychiatric assistant in the prosecutor's
office. But it must be clear that such a doctor of medicine is merely a specialist who
hires himself to give his special knowledge to the state for value received; he is not
a healer, not a physician, not a servant in the ministry of medical mercy. The
medico-psychological detective M. D. is no more a physician than a mechanic is
a physicist or a public accountant a mathematician.
3.

GREGORY, The Reciprocal Responsibility of Law and Psychiatry, THE
Philadelphia, April, 1949, P. 83.

ZILBOORO,

SHINGLE,

WALTER BROMBERG AND HERVEY M. CLECKLEY

II.

[Vol. 42

ROOTS OF CONFLICT

The real sources of difficulty which meet conscientious psychiatrists
in determining responsibility are chiefly as follows:
(1) The legal dictum that restricts opinion to one or the other of two absolute
choices in criminal trials-(a) total responsibility or (b) total irresponsibility due
to insanity.
(2) The underlying assumptions of faculty psychology which are inherent in
the McNaghten formula. Although these are consciously rejected in the psychiatrists' thinking, they nevertheless find their way into the experts' practical judgments
concerning criminal responsibility.
(3) The confusion in lay minds between the degree of obviously externalized
mental pathology (hallucinations or delusions) and the depth of actual ego pathology (psychopathology).
(4) The intrusion of basic personal convictions in problems of criminal responsibility about free-will or determinism, questions which are amenable only to
philosophic or theological argument, about which there is no scientific evidence.
These conceptual difficulties require careful consideration at this

point.
(1) The first problem is that of the presumed "all or none" character of criminal irresponsibility due to insanity. This situation has
been clearly stated on many occasions. In a California case of recent
date the Court4 reaffirmed the "all or nothing" approach: "Insanity
.. . is either a complete defense or none at all. There is no degree of
insanity which may be established to affect the degree of crime."
Confronted with such an absolute either-or-choice from which to
choose his answer, the physician often complains, criticizing law and
legal methods as out-moded, unrealistic or even as absurd.5 Still the
justification for this principle is clear; the court has only two choices in
its action. It must send the offender (1) to a penitentiary if sane, or
(2) to a mental hospital if insane. Nether the penitentiary nor the
sort of hospital usually available is well-adapted for the type of patient
who causes the chief confusion in medico-legal questions of criminal
responsibility.
However, there are other considerations bearing on this problem.
Recently the theory of partial responsibility for crime due to a degree
of mental disease less than that of legal "insanity" 6 has been brought
to the fore to render this absolutist attitude more in conformity with
psychiatric knowledge and experience. Their case was contiguous to
the problem of the all or none principle in that intent is modified by
4. People v. Cordova, 14 Cal. (2d) 308, 94P (2d), 40 (1939).
5. ZILBOORG, G., MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN, Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., New York, 1943.
6. WEIHOFEN, HENRY & OVERHOLSER, WINFRED "Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree
of a Crime, THE YALE LAW JOURNAL, Vol. 56:959, (1947).
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mental disturbance (in this case subnormality) not amounting to insanity or idiocy. These authors have urged the acceptance of the theory
"that mental disorder, though not so pronounced as to come within the
tests of criminal insanity, may nevertheless negative the particular
intent requisite to the crime charged."
The particular problem presented by these authors was a case of
murder 7 by a man who was mentally subnormal, where mitigation of
the charge of first-degree (premeditated) murder, due to mental disease, was disallowed. Weihofen and Overholser state their argument
as follows:
First-degree murder requires deliberation and premeditation. If these are absent
due to mental disease, premeditated murder cannot be charged. Scrutiny of the law
as to this point has shown that half the courts of this land confronted with this
question have answered the proposition stated above in the negative. In these states
it would seem that a person can be held guilty of committing a premeditated killing
even though he lacked the mental capacity to premeditate, providing the accused
was not one who could not comprehend he was doing wrong under the right and
wrong test.
To put the situation in graphic terms, it has been said that psychiatrists are faced with explaining the greys of human behavior which
cannot be fitted into legal categories of blacks and whites.
The inescapable fact is that neither logic nor experience permits
"the all or nothing assumption underlying our usual thinking on the
effect of mental disorder on criminal responsibility-the assumption
that a person is either 'sane' and consequently fully responsible for his
acts, or else 'insane' and 'wholly irresponsible.' "
It is inconsistent with the facts of clinical experience to assume that
the person suffering from disorder termed psychosis is necessarily without any awareness at all of such issues as right and wrong. There is
little or nothing in medical evidence to indicate that all degrees of disability short of demonstrable psychosis imply that the subject has
unimpaired (normal) ability to evaluate moral and ethical issues and
conduct himself properly thereby. Some patients with delusions and
hallucinations demonstrate to the physician their ability to understand
and to follow many accepted rules of conduct. Other patients free of
symptoms (obvious confusion, delusions, etc.) which would most readily explain a loss of ability to understand the "nature of the act," etc.,
show in their conduct strong evidence of abnormality in their evaluation of obvious social requirements. The physician called upon to give
evidence may have to say, if he is to be honest, that he believes the
7.

Fisher v. United States, 328 U.S. 463-495 (Oct. 1945).
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accused is abnormal and psychiatrically ill but that this illness does not
totally destroy the accused person's ability to distinguish between right
and wrong. He may have good reason to believe that the person's
psychiatric illness caused him to carry out the antisocial act without
presuming a total loss of ability to reason about ethical questions.
Rather than an irreconcilable conflict between the jurist and the
psychiatrist we must come to grips here with a broader and deeper
problem. If we admit, what is plain in clinical experience, that psychiatric disability occurs in many degrees, and in many forms that contribute to anti-social conduct without totally abolishing the knowledge
of right and wrong, we must if it is to be of any practical worth,
provide some alternative besides the two now available to most courts
for the disposition of the offender. The indeterminate sentence, special
institutions, probationary systems of control and other like measures
designed for the problems of those who do not fit into the two totally
unlike, but theoretically clear-cut categories, must be provided by
society. It is essential that workers in psychiatry and in law come together on a common ground of agreement in order to enable society
to provide medico-legal instrumentalities and institutional facilities for
a more reasonable and practical handling of numerous borderline
offenders.
(2) The suppositions of the "faculty" psychology are particularly
difficult to solve. It can perhaps be taken for granted that today neither
the psychiatrist nor the enlightened jurist any longer believes that the
human being can be effectively estimated and dealt with in terms of
disparate faculties which in life-experience are never encountered in
isolation. An intellect, emotions, a moral sense, a will, etc., can be set
apart in words and interminable discussion may revolve about these
verbal artifacts, but such discussion does not refer accurately or sensibly to anything we find in the functioning human being. For a great
part of the period which witnessed the development of concepts of
psychiatric disorder and of their effect on criminal responsibility, the
assumptions of faculty psychology prevailed. Moreover, there are
semantic difficulties involved here. For example: The identification of
"mind" with logical reasoning ability, of "mental disorder" with
clouded consciousnes or gross irrationality, is still common. Some of
our best organized textbooks on organic neurology include the psychoneuroses as disorders of the "nerves," sharply distinguished from those
of the "mind."
Nothing could be more fallacious than reasoning which is employed
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when one attempts to localize illness in a hypothetical "volition," ' dismembered from integrated human functioning. Arguments as to
whether an impulse is pathologically strong or pathologically weak soon
become little more practical or more enlightening than arguments about
priority between the hen and the egg. As Hall s points out, it has been
said that if legal questions are determined on such a basis "you will soon
make irresistible an impulse which now is resistible and resisted because
of penal law."
Efforts to apply the McNaghten rule with its inherent concepts to
cases on trial vividly illustrate the inapplicability of faculty psychology.
The alternative concept of a sudden "irresistible impulse" in an otherwise perfectly normal organism is unsupported by modern psychiatric
knowledge. Attempts within the confining framework of assumptions
calling for an examination not only of an "intellect," but also of a
"will," are unlikely to be helpful since in neither pursuit can we encounter a distinguishable element consistent with real life-experience.
Let us consider a case studied by Guttmacher 9 which will illustrate
a pertinent point:
Spencer married a woman who had been raped about six years before. The man
was found guilty of rape and was given a sentence of five years. Spencer's wife, a
very frail person, died without medical attention while this man was serving his
penitentiary sentence. The cause of death was not determined, but Spencer was
sure that her death was the result of the rape which had occurred six years before,
about three years before he had married her. The idea possessed .him that his
wife was not going to be abje to rest in her grave unless she was really avenged,
and he decided that it was his mission in life to right this great wrong. A few
months after this man had been released from the penitentiary, Spencer went up
to him and asked him to take a walk. They started walking down the road
together, and Spencer was overheard by some people who passed to say, 'You have
been responsible for my wife's death. I hear voices at times telling me that I must
kill you. Her spirit will never rest unless I carry out this request. I know that
I am likely to hang for it and it's the wrong thing for me to do, but there is
nothing else left for me to do.' Whereupon he killed him. He pleaded insanity
and the Court upheld by the Court of Appeals, ruled that he was not insane. The
Court of Appeals said it was dear that the witness heard Spencer say that he
was doing what he knew to be wrong and that he would be punished. That was all
that the Court needed to know in order to satisfy itself that he was a responsible
agent.
The patient as described by Guttmacher, despite the hallucinations
which undoubtedly would have insured his being classed as psychotic
by most psychiatrists, was regarded by the Court as "responsible" be8.

HALL,

JEROME,

GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 514, Bobbs, Merrill Co., Indian-

apolis, Ind., (1947).
9.
CAL

GUTTMAcHER, MANFRED, Criminal Responsibility. BULLETIN OF THE U.S. ARMY MEDI-
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cause of his own statement to the effect that it was wrong to commit
murder. An important question must be asked. Just how much "knowing" of the quality and nature of the act, just how much and what sort
of evaluation and emotional appreciation of it is proved or indicated
by such a statement from a man who is hallucinating? It might be
contended that the hallucinations themselves did not constitute an
adequate stimulus to the murder. But another question is necessary
about the effect of hallucinations on the state of this man's ego integration.
It is not unusual to find patients with schizophrenia who can pronounce correct verbal judgments about matters they fail to evaluate
adequately or react to normally. Recently one of us examined a defendant who had almost succeeded in strangling his wife to death. He
"knew" this act was wrong at the time, was not apparently angry with
her and was glad later he had been prevented from killing her. He had
felt influences "from within" which were more effective in determining
his decisions and acts than the impulse to avoid murder and to have his
wife remain alive. This patient, who also had hallucinations and was
obviously schizophrenic, did not attempt murder because of deficiency
in the "intellectual" concept of right and wrong, but because his
personality was so altered by illness that the social significance of the
act was diminished or disordered.
In the case discussed by Guttmacher, definite evidence of irrationality
was demonstrable. But the contrary evidence of a "rationality" at the
crucial point of being able to express an opinion that to kill the man was
wrong was accepted as proof that he "knew" the nature and quality of
the act. One might say that here we have a "lesion of the intellect"
demonstrated, but the lesion was not demonstrated to the satisfaction
of the Court to be in such a place as to prevent the man from making
a rational statement about his deed. It is doubtful if any psychiatrist
today conceives of personality function existing except as an integrated
process, as one in which no theoretically independent elements can be
isolated for practical study. We do not find man "thinking" without
also "feeling." We do not observe acts of "volition" altogether free of
emotion.
Hall ° clarifies the very point on which agreement may be reached
and intelligent action follow:
This view of the participation of the rational functions, including evaluation,
in normal conduct does not imply any depreciation of the role of the instincts.
For consistently with this theory one asserts the fusion of various aspects of the
10.

HALL, JEROME,

Ibid, 499.
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self. This means that moral judgment (knowledge of right and wrong) is not
reified as an outside, icy spectator of a moving self. On the contrary, the corollary
is that value-judgments are permeated with the color and warmth of emotion-as
is evidenced by the usual attitudes of approval that coalesce with right decisions.
Indeed all action, especially that relevant to the penal law, involves a unified
operation of the personality . . . . The McNaghten rules provide an analytical
device for dissecting this action.

If this view can be thus phrased by a jurist it seems obvious that
psychiatrists can venture honest and sensible opinions on what evidence
of medical impairment is found that may alter such a "knowing." When
no longer dismembered and falsified in one-dimensional aspect, but
considered in all that we sometimes imply by "appreciation," "realization," "normal evaluation," "adequate feeling," "significant and appropriate experiencing," etc., the term "knowing" does not restrict us

solely to a discussion of the patient's reasoning abilities in the abstract.
If the jurist and the psychiatrist would adopt the viewpoint expressed
with clarity and inclusiveness by Hall, it seems that much confusion
and inexactness would be avoided. After referring to typical arguments
between those who contend for "reason" as a criterion and those who

in contradiction emphasize "will," Hall': says:
Opposed to these views and avoiding their particularistic fallacies is the theory of
the integration of the self . . . . In terms of this theory any interaction with the
environment is integrated in the sense that the various functions of personality
coalesce and act as a unit. Although it is useful to distinguish the important "modes"

or attributes of such action, the various functions are not actually separate. On
the contrary, the affective, the cognitive, and the conative functions, as well as
all others, interpenetrate one another. Thinking (knowing, understanding) e. g.,
fuses with tendencies to action and it is permeated also in varying degrees by the
warmth of the emotions.

Hall suggests that concepts generally agreed upon in psychiatry be
utilized to "implement the McNaghten rules." To this suggestion we
will turn our attention later.

(3) The third difficulty points to an undue emphasis placed on the
presence or absence of external or peripheral manifestations of mental
disease in determining responsibility. In court, the more subtle indications of central pathology are often ignored by the jury. There is

general agreement that neither verbal reasoning nor other aspects of
peripheral mental function always serve as reliable tests of the severity
or genuineness of the personality disorder that lies beneath. Still, lay
persons and professionals alike are impressed by external symptoms,

such as delusions or hallucinations, to the point of relying on these
symptoms to establish well recognized legal status of insanity.
11.

HALL,

Ibid, 520-521.
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To the layman, even today, a patient in temporary delirium leaping
over chairs and taking the broom-stick to hallucinatory monsters looks
more genuinely psychotic than a deeply disordered but calm and brittleworded schizophrenic. The brilliant and persuasive paranoiac is still
less easy to recognize as psychotic but he may be seriously disabled.
Some masked or ambulatory schizophrenics show no legally demonstrable signs of a psychosis, though for years inner psychopathology
of a malignant sort has existed. The traditional attitude that limits
the demonstration of evidence of irresponsibility to the external (and
often the least important) aspect of what is being examined, forces the
psychiatric expert into an absurd position regarding modern scientific
psychiatry. This orientation, plus the demand for "all or none"
judgments makes the work of the expert witness difficult in court.
(4) Finally, the confusions introduced by conscious and unconscious
philosophic preoccupations and prejudices call for comment. When we
think in terms of moral responsibility, we are likely, unless we are
particularly careful to signify clearly what we are talking about, to find
ourselves in the empyrean of metaphysics atempting solutions of ultimate philosophical and religious questions. However important or
transcendent these questions may be, and however we answer them
for ourselves, we are not as psychiatrists qualified to answer them
expertly.
Is it possible for us to avoid attempts to settle the controversy over
free-will and determinism (or fore-ordination) and still give an honest
medical opinion about the questions we are asked in court?
Let us for a monent consider a viewpoint expressed by Grasset 12
approximately a half-century ago. Though immersed in many concepts
not particularly germane to the present status of psychiatry, this celebrated pioneer contributes, despite the obsolescence of his terms, something distinctly clarifying and useful. Refusing all temptations to
assume the role of arbiter in questions of man's moral obligations, (or
whether or not any such obligations exist), Grasset confines himself
to difficult enough but medically approachable problems. He attempts
a judgment on whether or not the capability of the organism is impaired.
Grasset's term "physiological responsibility" which he expresses in
terms of the relative integrity of "psychic neurones," corresponds in
a practical sense to our modern concept of the total personality and
12. GRASSET, JOSEPH, The Semi-Insane and the Semi-Responsible, Funk and Wagnalls Co.,
New York, 1907.
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the pathologic states, abstruse or obvious, which may impair its ordinary
capacity.
Not only is the pitfall of controversy about free-will versus determinism avoided by Grasset, but he also shows some respect for the complex
essence of human functioning (as opposed to "knowing," "willing,"
"feeling," etc., as separate conceptual abstractions). Referring to
what the psychiatrist must consider in estimating pathology and, hence,
criminal responsibility, he wrote:
It consists in responding, as other men do, to the influence of ordinary motives of
daily life, which rule conduct and human action, such as those drawn from religion,
morality and all current ideas. Not to respond to such influences; not to feel any
impression from things that impress everybody else; first to get to the point of
no longer feeling these motives, then little by little to cease to understand them-all
this means variation from the normal.

As emphasized by Grasset long ago it is the expert's job to give an
opinion on whether or not the particular subject is damaged or deranged to such a degree that he cannot be counted on to show ordinary
functional capacity. If we attempt to include in our opinion the ultimate
solution of the free-will versus determinism argument, our opinion is
not likely to be of practical value. Who can say that philosophical
determinism has any better claims to final proof than free-will?
Hall also brings out many points to indicate that a good deal of the
confusion we attribute to our legal co-workers (with their adherence
to tradition, etc.), may arise from our own unwarranted attempts to
force all interpretations to coincide with an unestablished doctrine
of ultimate determinism.
If this philosophical question can be set aside as external to the
professional fields of both the psychiatrist and the jurist, and if we do
not confine ourselves to one or another concept of faculty psychology,
Hall believes better opportunities for cooperative and successful medicolegal action would become available. Unless this can be done it is
difficult to escape the pessimistic conclusions expressed by Zilboorg:13
When they all individually and jointly .(judges, lawyers and jury), ask me
whether the defendant in the dock is in my opinion insane, I must candidly state,
if I am to remain true to my professional knowledge and faithful to my oath, first,
that I do not understand the question and, second, that since I do not understand
the question, I do not know whether the defendant is insane or not. I admit the
situation is embarrassing and puzzling to all concerned, but it is beyond my
knowledge and power to remedy or alleviate it.
13. ZILBooRG, GREGoRY, Misconceptions of Legal Insanity, AMER. J. ORTHOPSYcHIATRY,
Vol. 9, 1939, P. 540.
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Continuing a discussion of the basic differences between medical man
and jurist, Zilboorg makes many sound points and goes on to say:
We have reached a rather disquieting parting of the ways. This is undesirable from
both your (the jurist's) point of view and mine. Your rules are unintelligible to
me, and my inability to 4ollow them is unintelligible to you.
III.

Is

THE CONFLICT SOLUBLE?

Psychiatrists have thus been led to serious attempts to lessen the
disparity between legal standards and modern concepts of psychopathology. Solutions have been proffered, aiming to evade the "mythical" elements in the concept of responsibility by attacking the essential
problem which is the danger of an insane criminal to society. Thus,
Singer' 4 suggested a pragmatic solution by holding everyone responsible
for his acts whether sane or insane, and then adopting measures that
would (1) insure society against further criminal acts on the part of
this person; (2) establish clearly that society cannot, for its own protection, tolerate such acts regardless of the reasons back of them and,
(3) rehabilitate the offender if that is possible. Such a program however does not coincide with the traditional philosophy of criminal law
which directs that punishment be given for wrongdoing unless personal
irresponsibility is proved. There is no side-stepping the moral tenet
which "represents the unstudied belief of most men"' 5 and which underlies the civilized world's concept of criminal justice. The words of
Judge Nott

6

succinctly present the judicial viewpoint:

The law has laid down what may be termed a working rule .. .and, while medical men may criticize that rule . . .yet when you see ...its extreme simplicity,
the ease with which it can be applied . . .I am not aware of any better working

rule that these medical men or anyone else has ever put forward.
The burden of proof to improve tests of insanity in criminal offenders
would seem to rest with those who strive to assay the delicate nuances
of the mind in health and disease. To inveigh against "the vacuous
psychology of the McNaghten rule and the hypothetical question,"
(Zilboorg)1' seems to evade the obvious duty of psychiatry which is
to bring clarity and technical aid to an extremely complicated series of
social-psychological problems. More than that, the solution offered the
legal agents of society which would allow expert witnesses to discard
14.

Quoted from WIGMORE, The Deranged or Defective Delinquent, ILLINOIS CRIME SUR-

VEY 743 (1929).

15.
16.

Cunningham v. The State, 56 Miss. 269 (1879).
People v. Purcell, 214 N.Y. 693, 109 N.E. 1087.
17. ZILBOORG, GREGORY, Ibid.
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concepts of psychology no longer tenable, must be pragmatic and
workable.
From the analysis of attitudes and influences impinging on the psychiatrist's estimate of criminal responsibility in court, several constructive
suggestions arise. Three of these- suggestions are of a general nature
and revolve around the psychiatrist's daily activity in clinic and court.
The fourth is a specific suggestion for modification of the "test" of
insanity to be presented to the jury and expert witness. This latter
suggestion would require legislative enactment and would do much
to remedy the "cold war" which makes it difficult for psychiatrists to
translate concepts of mental pathology in terms of present legal tests.
The recommended measures to minimize the difficulties discussed
above are:
(a) That psychiatrists in discussion with lay groups when testifying
in court and when teaching medical students, accent the concept that
mental illness involves the total personality; the persistent aim of mental experts in their dealings with the lay public should be the elucidation
of the holistic view of the mind of man.
(b) Emphasis should be placed on the obvious fact that mental disease varies in degree within a tremendous range over minute gradations.
This attitude is especially to be urged in dealing with criminal behavior
resulting from the operation of pathologic impulses which range widely
from those bordering on normality to seriously distorted personality
reactions. It must also be emphasized that the ego which fails to deal
satisfactorily with such antisocial impulses may be grossly ill despite
the lack of ordinary irrationality as demonstrated in verbal tests. It is
a corollary that the anxiety of lay people, the legal profession, and many
psychiatrists lest such changes in attitude merely mean mollycoddling
of offenders, should be allayed. It is a demonstrable fact that such a
view of man's mental life more often leads to better protection of
society by adequate segregation and treatment of those who are
dangerous.
(c) That psychiatrists avoid the ultimate problem of free-will and
determination in their medical judgments, since the issue of mental
disease and crime can be met adequately short of the ultimate philosophic and religious questions involved.
(d) To implement this orientation it is recommended that the concept of "accountability" be substituted for that of "responsibility" in
the legal test for criminal responsibility. This would mean that the
question given the expert witness would be in language approximately
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as follows: "In your opinion, was the defendant suffering from disease
of the mind and if so, was it sufficient to render him unaccountable
under the law for the crime charged?"
This latter suggestion, being a significant one, requires discussion.
IV.

ACCOUNTABILITY,

A

SUGGESTED

LEGAL TEST

At the outset it is essential to examine the semantic connotations,
some obvious, some masked, but nevertheless potent, in the current
term "responsibility" and in the new term suggested, "accountability."
Although commonly considered synonymous, there are specific differences
between them, sufficient to draw moral issues and metaphysical assumptions into' what is exquisitely a problem in estimating the degree of
ego disorganization in a given offender at the time of a given crime.
The concept of criminal responsibility implies the fact of moral
knowledge; it presumes an acknowledgment that the individual is
required not to do wrong and not to act contrary to law and further,
that the accused knows what is wrong and what is right in social conduct and that, aside from mental deficiency or mental disease, he is
able to do what is right. The joint connotation of moral knowledge
and free choice of good conduct is indissolubly linked with the concept
of "responsibility," as evidenced by the legal principle which allows
such responsibility to be destroyed when insanity vitiates the power to
know one is doing wrong when he knows the wrong. On the other hand
the concept of "accountability" merely postulates an external valuejudgment which society applies to the individual for his acts, i.e. punishability. Accountability can likewise be destroyed when mental disease
is. shown to impair the adaptive capacities of the organism to social
standards. Accountability means punishment follows wrongdoing as
defined by statute; responsibility means human beings are required not
to do wrong because of a universal moral obligation.
Responsibility virtually means that an unwritten "agreement" is *comprehended by every person in which he accepts and integrates within his
conscience, the demand by society that he be "good." This structure
which we absorb with our mother's milk so to speak, is the essential
part of emotional education of children and is reinforced in the adult
world by the universal presence of law and its punitive agents. 'So
firmly has the "moral" law been imprinted on mankind that s6ciety has
come to regard its flouting either as a mark of insanity (to witness the
remark, "He's crazy with badness") or as a willful depravity demanding punitive retaliation. This prejudice underlies our collective reaction
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to, recidivistic criminals. It is an integral part of the influences that
enter into and shape particularly, the superego aspect of the human ego.
This is so well established as to require no explanation beyond the statement commonly made that ignorance of the law is no excuse. The courts
have frequently and impressively confirmed the view that moral knowledge is equivalent to knowledge of the law. As Judge Cardozol' put it,
"Knowledge that an act is forbidden by law will in most cases permit
the inference . . . (that) it is also condemned as an offense against
goodmorals ....
Obedience to the law is in itself a moral duty.' 'It isinteresting to trace the equivalence in authoritative legal decisions, of moral to legal "wrong" as related to the question of responsibility"for criiiiinal acts. The basic postulate in ethics has always 'beei
that knowledge of 'good means knowledge of God's laws, the premise
being that' the' ighest human wish approaches God's perfection.' The
breaking of one is tantamount to the breaking of the other. The present
tests for insanity seek, in fact, to assay the degree of insanity which
would piteveft !n individual' from understanding the laws of God and
man and how such a failure to understand accounts, for his thwarting
these,-1aws: This'maxim is set forth in the clearest terms by Sir James
Stephen,' 9 "A person who 'disbelieved in all moral .distinctions, and had
ridded himself of all conscience, would know that murder is wrong,
just as an atheist 'vould know that most Englishmen are Christians.'
An early statemexit of this principle was made in the Bellingham
cas'e20 'in which Lord Mansfield put the test concerning responsibility
of a madman in these words: "It must be proved beyond all doubt that
. .''he'did not consider that murder was a crime against the laws of
God and nature,"
SIn 1881, in a case of murder 2 1 on appeal; the judges stated, "The
laws of God and the iaws of the land are the measure of every man's
act and make it right or wrong . . .as it corresponds with such laws."
In 1915, Judge Nott 22 in explaining the McNaghten rule to the jury,
stated of the accused that by "knowing that it was wrong," was meant
"contrary to accepted standards of morality, contrary to the Laws of
God and Man."
It is inevitable then that when moral judgment or moral knowledge
remains the main point on which estimation of mental disease turns in
deciding criminal responsibility, psychiatry can 'offer little constructive
18. Court of Appeals, N.Y., 1915, 216 N.Y. 324, 110 N.E. 945.
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help. What this all pervasive attitude means is that psychiatrists and
the jury are called upon to estimate the influence of mental disease on
moral knowledge. As matters stand it means also that moral "judment"
or "knowledge" must be measured almost entirely by tests of what the
subject can rationalize in theory. How much or how little this rationalization truly reflects his actual judgment or evaluation is largely ignored.
What we urge is an estimation of the degree of ego disability existing
in the accused which would render him unaccountable or less than totally
accountable before the law. Thus would the question of moral knowledge, as it is injured by mental disability or not, be circumvented and
with it the whole question of whether or not man acts with a philosophically assumed free will to inculcated standards of moral behavior.
If the accused is mentally ill it is not necessary to put the question,
was his moral knowledge affected? Rather, we would ask was the
function of his ego so impaired that he could not, because of genuine
disability, act within the limits of social demands and rules? The question then becomes not whether his knowledge of the quality or nature
of the act, and his comprehension that he was doing wrong was affected,
but whether the total personality (i.e., the ego), was impaired by
mental disease to a degree rendering him unable to adjust to society's
rules.
This is not hair-splitting dialectics; it is a practical solution for the
psychiatrist who aids the court in judging the effect of insanity on criminal behavior. The present defense of an expert witness against the
difficulty of reconciling legal tests and psychotic behavior sometimes is
to say, "The accused is legally sane but medically psychotic." In doing
so the psychiatrist protects his medical position and describes the prisoner's condition within the limits of legal rules. But would it not be
more practical to present the test to the psychiatrist on the witness
stand in another form: "Is this man to be considered less than fully
accountable for his crime by virtue of mental disease, and to what
degree?" The answer would be forthcoming in terms of how disabled
the prisoner was and there would be no need for the dichotomy: legal
insanity or medical psychosis.
The anticipated benefit in expert testimony by the use of the concept
"accountability" is in the direction of providing an objective description
and analysis of subjective phenomena in persons accused of crime in
conjunction with an estimation of the degree of ego impairment resulting from his illness. In estimating the impairment the whole organism,
not merely a traditionally restricted area of mental function will be the
subject of the test, but the degree of disturbance of total personality
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function will be examined. It will not be a question of whether his
mental illness disturbs a moral sense to know right from wrong, but:
Shall society hold him to account for doing what he did because of illness
which impaired his capacity to react normally?
To be sure, morality is still recognized and valued, for society's demands and proscriptions follow a moral principle, but it does not enter
as a crucial test for a psychiatrist and jury to apply in cases of mental
illness. What the psychiatrist estimates is the degree of socio-biologic
impairment (illness) of the person in terms of present-day psychologic
knowledge. The jury then would decide to accept or reject the psychiatrist's opinion of how accountable the' prisoner is without recourse
to the "knowledge of right and wrong" test. The suggested test is
broader and more realistic. It is not applied to an arbitrarily isolated
"moral sense" but to the functional capacity of the actual human
organism as he is encountered in practical life and in medical study.
It may be argued that this reorientation of the insanity test in criminal defense would put too much power in the hands of psychiatrists.
And that, further, their knowledge of what impairs the ego function
in such delicate areas as mental abnormality, to say nothing of moral
behavior, is still too scanty. It can be successfully argued, however,
that our present day knowledge of the personality in health and disease
is sufficient and objective enough to help more precisely the layman's
understanding of human behavior and misbehavior.
Such a reorientation as proposed would enable the expert to give
testimony more consistent with the established facts in his field of
knowledge. With such an innovation there would still be room for difference of opinion in any given case. Application of a' test for insanity
based on accountability as opposed to responsibility, would not preclude
psychiatrists appearing on opposing sides, but it would considerably
reduce contentiousness because the accent would be on the degree of
the prisoner's mental illness instead of confined to narrow criteria, such
as the presence or absence of delusions.
Substituting the concept of accountability for that of responsibility
should dispose of the difficulties presented by the McNaghten decision
to expert witnesses. By emphasis on psychiatric findings bearing upon
the degree of ego disorganization i.e., upon genuine disorder whether
obvious or masked, and its effect on behavior, the psychiatrist will be

better able to aid the court to whom society has assigned the difficult
and complex task of determining moral responsibility in crime.

